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Abstract
Controversy surrounds structural reform in local government, especially on the question of
whether efforts aimed at reducing the number of local authorities enhance the effective operation
of the newly created consolidated local government entities. However, the weight of extant
conceptual and empirical evidence suggests that while amalgamation typically improves the
capacity of local government, it is not only costly, but also has other deleterious consequences.
Local council collaboration through resource sharing and joint service provision aimed at
capturing the advantages attendant upon scale, but without the adverse democratic and economic
effects of consolidation, represents the main alternative form of structural change which still
retains local government activity within the public sphere. This paper considers the foundations
of shared services, including the embryonic theoretical literature and available empirical
evidence, as background to considering the problem of developing policies to promote intermunicipal collaboration.
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INTRODUCTION
In comparison with higher tiers of government, the range of services provided by local
government across different national jurisdictions is characterised by substantial heterogeneity.
While in some countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, local authorities deliver a
comparatively narrow array of services, focused mostly on ‘services to property’, in other
national contexts, like the United Kingdom, the local government sector offers a much broader
assortment of services, including numerous ‘services to people’ (Dollery, Garcea and LeSage,
2008). A further complicating factor resides in the fact that in many local government systems,
the composition and quality of service provision is largely prescribed by central and state
governments rather than decided by local authorities themselves. This complexity deepens when
we consider the wide variety of methods employed to deliver these services. Throughout the
developed world, local government adopts an intricate mix of approaches encompassing not only
traditional ‘in-house’ delivery, but also alternative delivery modes, including for-profit, nonprofit, inter-municipal cooperation, franchises, subsidies, and through volunteers (Andrews and
Entwistle, 2010). Moreover, reliance on these different methods is evolving through time in
accordance with both prevailing managerial doctrine and learned experience (Warner and Hefetz,
2008).
In addition to these complexities, the fiscal characteristics of different local government systems
diverge considerably, presenting problems for comparative analysis. However, in general, while
industrialized countries usually exhibit a greater degree of fiscal decentralisation than their
developing counterparts, even local government in the developed world is still typically far from
financially self-sufficient, with some exceptions, like the United States (Bahl and Cyan, 2011).
Similarly, patterns of outlays differ markedly in different jurisdictions and seldom fully reflect
local preferences, given the widespread prevalence of mandated expenditure and service
standards. In essence, in many jurisdictions, local government entities face harsh expenditure and
revenue constraints which limit local autonomy, and these constraints vary between jurisdictions
(Shah, 2006a).
Even the structure of local government itself exhibits immense complexity. Thus massive
population size differentials exist between local government entities in most jurisdictions. For
instance, in Germany local authorities vary from Wiedenborstel with only seven residents to
Berlin with a populace of about 4.3 million (Lenk and Falken-Grober, 2008). Much the same is
true of spatial size differentials. For example, in Western Australia, local government areas range
from 2 to 378,533 square kilometres in size (Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional
Development and Local Government, 2010). Similar marked differences are evident in
population densities.
The structural characteristics of local government in different countries differ in many other
ways as well. For instance, in some national systems, local government represents a single tier of
government, whereas other systems are multi-tiered, with several layers of local government, as
in boroughs in metropolitan local government structures. Along analogous lines, local
government activity as a proportion of national income, and as a percentage public sector
expenditure, varies a great deal between different countries (Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez and
Youngman, 2010; Shah, 2006a; 2006b).
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These and other complexities in real-world local government systems render comparative
analysis tricky and make definitive generalisation difficult (Wolman, 2008). One way of
approaching the problem of local government reform is to distinguish between different kinds of
reform processes. A useful taxonomy has been developed by Garcea and LeSage (2005) which
comprises five discrete dimensions of local government reform programs: structural,
jurisdictional, functional, financial, and internal governance and management reforms. By
decomposing local government reform in terms of this typology, and then focusing on a single
aspect of reform, it is possible to reduce the complexity of comparative analysis to manageable
proportions. The present paper thus limits its focus to structural reform.
Garcea and LeSage (2005, p. 5) defined structural reform as the reconfiguration of local
government in terms of the ‘number, types, and size of municipalities, quasi-municipalities, and
municipal special-purpose bodies’. In all multi-tiered systems of government, regardless of
whether they are federal or unitary systems, a distinction can be drawn between vertical and
horizontal decentralization. Horizontal decentralization refers to the spatial disaggregation of
governmental functions at the same level, with several governmental entities providing a given
similar range of services, while vertical decentralization describes a hierarchy in which different
levels of government perform different functions. Structural reform in local government
generally deals with horizontal centralization and decentralization. Thus structural reform
programs typically attempt to concentrate local councils into larger public entities, or fragment
local government into smaller bodies, or encourage existing local authorities to collaborate in
service provision through shared service platforms and other institutional mechanisms.
It is commonly argued that by changing the structure of local government, structural reform will
have various beneficial efficiency and equity effects on the operation of local authorities without
diminishing the efficacy of local democracy. A stronger claim holds that different local
government structures possess different efficiency characteristics, which in turn implies that
some ‘optimal’ structural form exists. Moreover, in policy debates this proposition is extended to
include the claim that it is possible to identify an optimum size for local government, frequently
rendered as simply ‘bigger is better’ or ‘bigger is cheaper’ in local government. Structural reform
should thus aim to reduce the number and size of local councils to approximate this optimum
size. It need hardly be added that this claim is controversial in both theoretical and empirical
terms (see, for example, Boyne 1998; Oakerson 1999; Bish 2000; Sancton 2000; Dollery and
Crase 2004; Dollery, Crase and Johnson, 2006; Dollery and Robotti, 2008; Jimenez and
Hendrick, 2010; Leland and Thurmaier, 2010).
In real world local government reform programs, structural change through either the
compulsory or voluntary consolidation of two of more small local governments into larger
municipal entities is frequently presented by its advocates as an efficacious method of enhancing
the operational efficiency of local authorities, improving their administrative and technical
capacity, generating cost savings, and strengthening strategic decision-making. Opponents of
forced amalgamation typically point to the divisive controversy generated by municipal mergers,
the absence of supportive empirical evidence, the equivocal outcomes observed in real-world
case studies, and the diminution of local democracy. Moreover, in actual policy debates,
structural change through compulsory council consolidation is often met with arguments for
shared services as a superior means of achieving the intended aims of amalgamation. Proponents
of shared services commonly argue that since only some local services exhibit scale economies,
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scope economies, density economies, and other positive attributes of municipal size, structural
change should concentrate on the joint provision of these services. In other words, shared
services are presented as a method of reaping the benefits of amalgamation without its
deleterious costs.
The broad proposition that structure has decisive effects on behaviour and performance has a
long history in the industrial organization literature in economics as the structure-conductperformance paradigm (SCP) developed by Mason (1949), Bain (1951; 1956) and others. The
SCP perspective held that a stable and causal relationship existed between the structure of an
industry, organizational conduct, and economic performance. However, more recent work in this
tradition reversed the causal chain by demonstrating that poor performance can induce changes
on organizational conduct, which in turn can influence industry structure
Controversial claims centred on the proposition that structural reform should seek to increase the
size of local government entities through ‘amalgamation’ or ‘consolidation’ programs aimed at
reducing the number of local authorities rest not only tenuous and uncertain theoretical and
empirical foundations, but also faces a growing literature on alternative models of local
government which seek to reap any advantages contingent upon size through various
partnerships, shared service platforms and other arrangements between small municipalities (see,
for instance, Dollery, Crase and Johnson 2006; Warner and Hefetz, 2008; Tomkinson, 2007)2.
This paper explores these alternative structural approaches to the problem of achieving greater
efficiency and improved capacity in local government service provision, which simultaneously
seek to retain local political autonomy, local ‘voice’ and local ‘choice’. The focus falls on shared
service arrangements between local authorities as the chief alternative to structural change aimed
at consolidation, rather than other service delivery modes, such as improving internal service
delivery, contracting with the private sector, or other approaches (Brown, Potoski and Van
Slyke, 2008; Warner and Hebdon, 2001).
Although shared services and other collaborative inter-council ventures are typically described
using different terminology in different countries, such as inter-jurisdictional agreements (IJAs)
(Andrew, 2009) or inter-local agreements (ILAs) (Carr, Gerber and Lupher, 2009) in the United
States, and shared services in Australia (Dollery and Akimov, 2008) and the United Kingdom
(Tomkinson, 2007), they generally represent institutional mechanisms for tackling common
problems in fragmented local government systems. In this paper, we use the term ‘shared
services’ to describe all of these collaborative arrangements.
The paper is divided into five main parts. Section 2 provides a synoptic outline of the conceptual
foundations for joint or shared service arrangements in local government by way of background.
Section 3 considers the empirical evidence on the nature of shared service provision in local
government, including those characteristics which make specific services suitable for
collaborative delivery. Section 4 comprises a brief survey of available empirical analysis on the
effectiveness of shared service arrangements in practice. Section 5 tackles the problem of
developing sound public policies towards structural change in local government aimed at

2

Shared services are also variously referred to in the literature on local government as ‘resource sharing’, ‘joint
production’, ‘joint ventures’, and ‘interlocal agreements’ or ‘ILAs’. These terms are assumed to have the same
proximate meaning as shared services in this paper.
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improving service efficiency and service quality by means of shared service arrangements. The
paper ends with some brief concluding remarks in section 6.

CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
A voluminous literature surrounds the problem of how best to improve horizontal
decentralization through the reorganization of government in multi-tiered systems of
government. Scholars have considered inter alia whether efforts to reform local government
through horizontal structural change should concentrate on centralizing local authorities by
merging them into larger entities, or retain the existing local government structures but modify
service provision through ‘partnership’ arrangements between local authorities for defined
functions. Put differently, in a policy context, should local structural reform policies attempt to
consolidate local authorities into larger public bodies, or encourage existing local councils to
collaborate in service provision?
One way of approaching this question is to place it in an extended taxonomy of horizontal
models first developed by the Local Government Association of Queensland (2005): (a)
‘merger/amalgamation’, where two or more entities are consolidated into a single larger local
authority; (b) ‘significant boundary change’, where the spatial area of municipal jurisdictions is
altered, but existing government structures are left intact; (c) ‘resource sharing through service
agreements’, in which one local authority undertakes specific functions for other local councils,
such as in regional waste management; (d) ‘resource sharing through joint enterprise’, in which
municipalities combine in given areas of service provision to accrue scale advantage, as in
regional development initiatives; and (e) shared service provision through the establishment of
system-wide entities, as in procurement initiatives. While more nuanced variations of these basic
models can be adduced, such as ‘joint administration’ models which share all functions except
political independence, they nonetheless serve to underline the basic conceptual distinction
between structural change which reduces the number of existing local government entities and
structural change which retains existing local councils but transforms aspects of service
provision
The conceptual foundation for shared services rests on the Oakerson (1999, p. 7) distinction
between service ‘provision’ and service ‘production’ in local government. Whereas the provision
of local services involves determining which services to offer, the quantity and quality of these
services, as well as funding service delivery, the production of local services involves ‘in-house’
creation of a service rather simply than its financial provision. The separation of provision from
production thus enables local government to choose between different modes of producing
services. Oakerson (1999, p. 17-18) has identified seven generic methods: (a) traditional ‘inhouse production’; (b) ‘coordinated production’ where councils cooperate on activities affecting
both jurisdictions; (c) ‘joint production’ where municipalities use a single production unit; (d)
‘intergovernmental contracting’ where municipalities contract services from other councils or
other tiers of government; (d) ‘private contracting’ where councils contract with private entities;
(e) ‘franchising’ where private entities produce council services which residents can purchase;
and (f) ‘vouchering’ where local authorities set service standards, but private entities produce the
services in exchange for council vouchers.

6

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

If shared services are defined as cooperative arrangements between local authorities, local
government associations, and other tiers of government, then ‘coordinated production’, ‘joint
production’, and ‘intergovernmental contracting’ constitute shared services in local government
in the Oakerson (1999) typology. However, ‘private contracting’, ‘franchising’ and ‘vouchering’
do not meet this definition since they typically involve contractual arrangements outside of the
public sector, mostly from commercial enterprises. They thus possess additional characteristics
derived from their for-profit nature, particularly strong incentives to reduce costs compared with
non-profit entities. This can result in lower service quality, less responsiveness to the public, and
fewer workers delivering a given service. Given the difficulties inherent in monitoring complex
local government services, this implies that contracting councils generally lose at least some
degree of control over service provision. Thus, as a general rule, contractual arrangements with
private firms are not equivalent to shared service models (Dollery, Grant and Crase, 2010;
Warner and Hefetz, 2008).
In common with attempts at developing typologies of local government (see, for instance, Shah,
2006c), some scholars have sought to classify shared service models. For example, drawing on
British local government, Tomkinson (2007) proposed a quadrilateral taxonomy: (a) ‘intraservice model’ which includes limited shared service options, such as procurement services’ (b)
‘service model’ which incorporates a separate formal structure to which member councils cede
budgetary control, service specification, statutory service responsibilities, etc.; (c) ‘corporatist
model’ which involves the establishment of a joint governing body and delivery entity to deliver
services with costs and benefits borne by partner councils; and (d) ‘supra-corporate model’
which employs a ‘special purpose vehicle’, such as a joint venture company, to deliver a
specified service to councils.
Along analogous lines, Dollery, Grant and Akimov (2010) have proposed a tripartite
classification derived from Australian local government: (a) ‘horizontal shared service models’
which represent joint arrangements between local authorities ranging from ad hoc resource
sharing to full shared administration models; (b) ‘vertical shared service models’ which involve
cooperation between local authorities and state/national local government association typically
offering a defined service to councils for a fee; and (c) ‘intergovernmental contracting model’ in
which local councils voluntarily undertake functions for regional/state/national governments.
Despite the prevalence of shared service arrangements and other kinds of joint collaboration in
local government, it has attracted scant attention in the literature. The main theoretical approach
has followed Buchanan’s (1965) theory of clubs since collaborative partnerships between local
authorities establish a ‘club’ in which only member municipalities receive the services jointly
provided. Building on this approach, Frey and Eichenberger (1999) have developed ‘functional
federalism’ in which public entities arise endogenously to meet specific functional objectives.
Casella and Frey (1992) extended this model and contrasted it with ‘hierarchical federalism’, in
which higher levels of government impose structure upon local government.
However, the functional federalist paradigm has neglected the question of the organizational
form adopted by cooperative partnerships. Following Van den Berg and Braun (1999), Bartolini
and Fiorillo (2008) developed a model which considered problem of the optimal partnership
structure for council consortia and council unions which differed in terms of transaction costs,
flexibility and integration. While a consortium represents a formal arrangement to produce
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specific services, a union is an autonomous entity with powers to decide how to manage its
delegated functions.
This embryonic approach has also investigated the factors which influence the longevity of local
government partnerships. Building on Brosio, Maggi and Piperno (2003) and Quagliani (2006),
Palestrini and Polidori (2008) developed a theoretical model which evaluated voluntary
partnerships between existing councils aimed at providing local public services, like waste
collection, and found that financial incentives from higher tiers of government to promote their
formation should be timed to coincide with the time horizons of local elected representatives.
The final strand in this nascent theoretical literature considers the ostensible paradox that while
substantial gains can flow from collaborative partnerships (see, for example, Bartolini and
Fiorillo 2005; 2006), local authorities seldom form partnerships and existing arrangements are
occasionally dissolved (Palestrini and Polidori 2006). Policy makers keen to promote shared
service platforms in local government have employed incentives to encourage both the
establishment and longevity of voluntary partnerships. In an effort to determine the optimal type
of incentive, Fiorillo and Pola (2008) found that on theoretical and empirical evidence suggested
that intergovernmental transfers proportional to local taxes represent the most efficient form of
incentive.
Although this emergent literature has provided some insights into the structure of shared service
entities in local government, in common with much economic modelling in other areas of
scholarly endeavour, it rests on simplifying assumptions, some of which fail to capture the
complexities of the local government environment, with its dual economic efficiency/democratic
representation tensions (Aulich, 2005). Furthermore, the ‘situational determinism’ embedded in
neoclassical economic analysis, which disallows autonomous discretionary behaviour
characteristic of local government (Latsis, 1972), sits uneasily in real-world municipal decision
making. This seems to suggest policy makers and scholars alike should rely more on empirical
evidence rather than on a priori ‘economistic’ theorising.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE NATURE OF SHARED SERVICE PROVISION
Despite the fact that most local government systems in the developed world employ shared
service arrangements in some form or another, surprisingly little scholarly effort has been
directed at the empirical analysis of the characteristics shared service models in practice and the
bulk of empirical assessment can be found in advocatory commercial consulting literature and
public inquiries (see, for instance, Serco Institute publications)3. In their survey of the Australian
and international empirical evidence on shared services in local government, Dollery, Akimov
and Byrnes (2009) provided a synoptic review of the major studies drawn from both of these
strands in the literature.
After reviewing available Australian and international evidence on shared services in local
government, Dollery, Akimov and Byrnes (2009, p.216) drew ‘six general observations’ from
their survey: (a) empirical evidence indicated that shared service implementation can ‘improve
3

For surveys of this limited literature see, for example, Dollery, Akimov and Byrnes (2009) and Thurmaier and
Wood (2004).
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the efficiency of local service delivery’; (b) some local services appeared ‘more amenable to
shared service arrangement than others’; (c) common local government shared services included
information technology, human resource management, procurement; and waste management; (d)
even within these service functions, ‘the degree of success varies dramatically from case to
case’; (e) various ‘identifiable barriers to the implementation of shared service arrangements’
exist, which seem ‘difficult to overcome’; and (f) these barriers to the implementation of shared
service models included a fear of losing ‘municipal identity’, the ‘complexity of the process’,
‘conflicting objectives’ between putative partners and ‘uncertain benefits’.
From a policy perspective, a critical aspect of shared service platforms resides in the question:
which local goods and services best lend themselves to shared service arrangements in local
government? While surveys of the types of shared services actually employed in practice, such
as Dollery, Akimov and Byrnes (2009) and Thurmaier and Wood (2004), provide a valuable
guide to answering this question, at a more general level, it is useful to identify the generic
characteristics of local services, given the immense diversity of services provided in real-world
local government systems internationally. Following applied work done by Percy Allan (2001;
2003), as well as the New South Wales Independent Inquiry into Local Government (NSW LGI,
2006) led by him, six characteristics have been identified: ‘low core capability’ of local
authorities; ‘high supplier availability’; ‘low task complexity’; significant scale economies;
‘specialized technology’; and ‘low asset specificity’.
‘Core capability’ refers to the ‘steering’ and not ‘rowing’ capacities of local authorities, such as
policy planning and service monitoring, without core capability they cannot adequately discharge
their statutory responsibilities. Thus only low core capabilities should be shared. The existence
or otherwise of potential contractors is a second factor since if shared service arrangements fail,
then there is an exigency option. Allan (2001, 40) has argued that ‘complex tasks are difficult to
monitor, hard to measure for inputs and require unique expertise to monitor’ and are thus
generally unsuitable for sharing. The question of scale economies has obvious bearing on the
decision to enter shared service agreements. The costs of acquiring specialized technology, such
information technology, and then maintaining, upgrading and operating this equipment are
substantial, which make these kinds of services prime candidates for shared service
arrangements. Finally, Allan (2001: 40) proposed that ‘where a task requires an expensive and
specific asset it may be more cost effective for the council to provide the asset’ and thus shared
service models can defray high fixed costs.
With respect to which municipal services and functions are most amenable to shared service
arrangements, Allan (2001: 46) has argued that ‘there is no reason to why most core community
services’, such as road maintenance, domestic waste, town planning, recreation facilities and
welfare services, as well ‘backroom support services’, including finance, information technology
and human resource management, should not be ‘delivered or arranged by a central
administration unit owned and controlled by several councils’. However, Allan (2001) added two
qualifications this general conclusion: (a) each local authority should secure performance
agreements with the shared service unit which stipulate ‘specific rights and obligations’ and (b)
the shared service entity should be governed by a board of directors drawn from all participating
municipalities
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF SHARED SERVICES
While limited empirical analysis has been conducted on the characteristics of shared services
provision, there is, however, a relatively small but growing body of empirical literature on the
effectiveness of shared services arrangements. In Australia, for instance, a number of studies
have provided concrete examples on the effectiveness of shared services arrangements between
local councils. For example, Dollery and Byrnes (2006) examined the case of the South
Australian Walkerville Council and its experience with shared services arrangements involving
neighbouring local municipalities. The Walkerville Council entered into nine agreements with a
range of municipal councils to jointly deliver services in: (i) waste collection, (ii) home care, (iii)
crime deterrence, (iv) library facilities, (v) environmental protection, and (vi) inspection services.
These agreements provided a variety of benefits including cost savings to local councils and an
wide range of services to local constituents.
In another study, Dollery et al., (2005) investigated the shared services arrangements of the
Riverina Eastern Regional Organisation of Councils (REROC), which involved thirteen local
councils in southern NSW. Between 1998 and 2003 it was estimated that these shared services
arrangements resulted in a saving of $4.5 million. Areas in which shared services proved to be
most effective included: (i) waste management, (ii) joint tendering and purchasing, (iii)
information technology, (iv) compliance initiatives, and (v) lobbying activities.
In the United Kingdom, the issue of improving the productivity of public service delivery
(including the provision of local government services) was the core focus of the Blair
Government following the release of the ‘Gershon Review’ (Gershon, 2004). In Britain, local
councils are required, following legislation enacted by the Blair Government, to submit bi-annual
Local Authorities Efficiency Statements. Many British councils report joint service delivery
arrangements as a means of delivering cost savings and improving the range of services
delivered to their citizens. The most commonly cited shared services include joint procurement,
information technology, ‘back-office’ functions and compliance activities.
In the US, a number of studies have employed regression-based techniques to examine a range of
issues pertaining to effectiveness of shared services. For example, Hawkins (2009) identified that
the three most commonly cited reasons for establishing joint ventures were to: (i) improve a
municipality’s economic advantage; (ii) secure economic resources that would not otherwise be
available; and (iii) take advantage of economies of scale. Moreover, Chen and Thurmaier (2010)
also found that among local municipalities in Iowa the equitable sharing of benefits among
participants was an important factor in establishing successful interlocal arrangements. More
recently, Hawkins (2010) found that collaboration on ‘economic development’ joint ventures
between US local government authorities is influenced by a number of factors including the
presence of high levels of social capital and frequent communication between key stakeholders.
Empirical studies in the US have also been undertaken by LeRoux and Carr (2007; 2010). In an
attempt to explain US local government cooperation on public services such as water and
sewerage in Michigan, LeRoux and Carr (2007) found that collaboration was affected by a
number of factors including: (i) economic factors, (ii) population growth, and (iii) the
characteristics of the communities in the adjoining area. In a subsequent case study, LeRoux and
Carr (2010) investigated the structure of interlocal networks among 44 local governments in
Wayne County, Michigan. Results indicate that local government entities cooperative more
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extensively on the provision of local public services such as waste disposal rather than on
‘lifestyle services’ such as parks and recreation.
In another study, Kwon and Feiock (2010) put forward a case that intergovernmental service
agreements should be viewed as a two-step process. In the first step, local communities consider
whether or not to collaborate. In the second step, the likelihood of entering into an agreement is
conditional upon the likelihood that a local community has expressed a preference for
collaboration. Drawing on survey data, the authors used a two-part Heckman probit model to
investigate this process. In the first step, the results suggest that collaborations are more “likely
to be considered in relatively affluent cities experiencing population declines and economic
conditions” (Kwon and Feiock, 2010, 881). In the second step, the results indicate the ‘at-large’
election of US councillors (compared to district systems) and a history of previous interlocal
fiscal arrangements was predictive of forming a joint agreement conditional upon the local
community expressing a preference for collaboration.
In another study, Ruggini (2006) provided examples of successful shared services arrangements.
Areas in which shared services proved to be most successful included joint procurement,
emergency services, and records management. Along similar lines, Honadle (1984) also
presented successful inter-municipal cooperation cases in procurement, information technology,
fire and police services, bus system services, and health services.
Derman and Gates (1995) base their analysis on a 1991 survey undertaken by the New Jersey
Department of Community Affairs. At the time this survey was conducted, over 400 ‘interlocal’
service programs were managed by New Jersey municipalities, including 38 purchasing
cooperatives and over 20 joint insurance funds. Derman and Gates (1995) argued that for nearly
all local government functions (excluding police and fire-fighting) there is scope for shared
services arrangements to be implemented.

SHARED SERVICES AND PUBLIC POLICY
If shared services represent the best structural alternative to local government consolidation, at
least in terms of retaining local service production within the public sphere, rather than
outsourcing or privatizing service production, then this raises interesting questions for public
policy towards local government. In particular, it is useful to consider (a) obstacles to the
establishment of shared service models and how best these can be surmounted through policy
intervention and (b) the reasons why local authorities have adopted shared services and how
these factors can be harnessed to stimulate further shared service implementation. While some
empirical work has been done on (a) and (b) in the area of local government (see Dollery,
Akimov and Byrnes (2009), in both the scholarly literature (see, for example, Honadle, 1984 and
Ruggini, 2006), as well as by commercial concerns (see, for instance, Serco Solutions, 2005),
scant attention has been paid to the problem of how best to encourage the adoption of shared
services through system-wide policy intervention.
A useful framework for considering both (a) and (b) has recently been developed by Hawkins
(2009) as part of an empirical study into joint ventures aimed at economic development in 12
American metropolitan statistical areas. Using the conceptual prism provided by transactions
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cost theory, Hawkins (2009) identified three main barriers to the adoption of shared service
arrangements in local government: ‘coordination problems’, ‘division problems’, and ‘defection
problems’. According to Hawkins (2009, 110/111), shared service agreements between local
authorities are more difficult to strike when ‘there are no joint gains’, when the a priori
establishment of ‘roles and responsibilities for implementation’ is problematic, and when there is
a lack of ‘knowledge of the costs and benefits of an agreement’ and ‘participant preferences and
behavior’, including possible ‘future opportunistic behavior’. Division problems arise when there
is ‘agreement on the goals’ but distrust on the question of ‘dividing and distributing benefits
among the participants’, such as the allocation of costs between member councils and the
distribution of assets in the event of dissolution. Finally, defection problems may materialize
when ‘one party does not comply with the agreement’ and ‘in the absence of a credible mutual
commitment to uphold the agreement’, participating municipalities ‘have an incentive to defect
and become “free riders”’. These barriers effectively encompass the ‘complexity of the process’,
‘conflicting objectives’ between participants and ‘uncertain benefits’ pinpointed in the Dollery,
Akimov and Byrnes, (2009) survey. However, Hawkins (2009) ‘economic’ focus did not
embrace the sociological ‘loss of municipal identity’. Moreover, neither of these constellations of
factors includes legal impediments which are often obstacles. For example, in the New South
Wales local government system, local councils are prevented from forming for-profit corporate
entities, which has served to inhibit the formation of dedicated special purpose vehicles to
deliver shared services and thereby presumably prevented the formation of numerous shared
service entities.
Given the institutional, legal and manifold other complexities in local government, which render
generalization across different local government systems fraught with difficulty, only broad
generic policy approaches are possible. In terms of Hawkins (2009) tripartite taxonomy of
barriers to the adoption of shared service arrangements, it is feasible to identify several standard
policy options. Thus, coordination problems are hard to overcome, especially with inherently
uncertain ex anti information on the prospects of success of a joint venture. For this reason, it
seems important for the higher tier of government responsible for legislating for a local
government jurisdiction to provide a legal ‘template’ for shared service arrangements which
would bind participating local authorities on matters of coordination, such as governance
regulations, the apportionment of costs and revenues between member councils, and the like.
While this has the obvious disadvantage of removing a degree of local flexibility arising from
varied local circumstances, it provides not only more certainty, but also serves to reduce
establishment costs since participants can simply use the centrally-generated legal instruments.
Since shared services represent an excellent avenue for regional cooperation between small
municipalities, typically with limited administrative capacity and harsh budgets constraints,
anything which lowers establishment costs must promote new joint ventures.
A similar policy posture on the part of the responsible central or state government can also be
adopted towards ameliorating ‘division problems’, and ‘defection problems’. For example,
legislative provision could be made to produce binding outcomes on agreed principles: thus
establishment costs could be allocated on the basis of the revenue base of member councils,
revenue distributed in proportion to the financial contribution of participants, etc. An analogous
legal constraint could be set in place to minimize ‘defection problems’. For instance, a ‘once-instay-in’ stipulation could be added to the legal template which would serve to prevent any
member municipality from leaving a shared service entity once they have agreed to join.
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Hawkins (2009) also proposed a useful quadrilateral conceptual framework for considering the
question of why local authorities wish to cooperate through shared service arrangements made
up of the following factors: ‘service delivery costs and scale economies’; ‘resource acquisition,
development opportunities and externalities’; ‘third party coercion and incentives’; and ‘local
and regional reputation’. In the first place, Hawkins (2009, 109) contends that ‘cost savings are
cited as the dominant reason for entering into interlocal contracts for service provision’,
especially in ‘infrastructure expansion through cooperation’ since this enables the local
governments involved to spread high capital costs and ‘thereby reduce the costs of service
delivery’. A second economic motive in this regard centers on ‘improved service management
and quality’, particularly in the case of small local authorities with limited managerial expertise
and capacity.
Secondly, the ‘resource acquisition, development opportunities and externalities’ motive for
entering into shared service agreements resides primarily in the fact that ‘voluntary agreements
may be formed in order to generate community resources that may be relatively difficult to
accumulate by acting alone’ (Hawkins, 2009, 109). Similarly, collective action can effectively
tackle interjurisdictional externalities resulting from economic development and other spillover
activities. Regional imperatives of this kind require either cooperation between affected local
authorities or the creation of regional bodies independent of local government.
‘Third party coercion and incentives’ refers to the commonplace occurrence that while shared
service arrangements are created and run primarily by the local government entities involved, ‘a
variety of organizations are often heavily involved in working with government units to spur
development, manage cross-jurisdictional issues, and generally work toward local and regional
development goals’ (Hawkins, 2009, 109). Third party intrusion can often be beneficial, notably
‘in order to resolve disagreements, facilitate collective action, and provide a mechanism by
which to monitor agreements over time’. It can also provide incentives, such as financial grants
and subsidies, which can stimulate the establishment of shared service entities, strengthen their
activities and promote their longevity.
Finally, Hawkins (2009, 110) proposed that ‘local and regional reputation’ represented an
important ingredient in the establishment of shared service arrangements since ‘organizations
often want to be considered good partners in joint efforts and improve their reputation for future
cooperative endeavors’. Moreover, the establishment of shared service partnerships may
‘increase the visibility of a local government in a region as a community that is being innovative
and proactive toward solving local problems’. Political considerations are not insignificant: the
conclusion of partnership agreements immediately prior to elections may improve the electoral
prospects of incumbents.
Despite its attractions, the Hawkins (2009) framework is not complete. In particular, additional
‘second-best’ elements can be identified, falling partly under ‘third party coercion and
incentives’. For instance, in Australian local government systems, a familiar motivation for the
establishment of regional shared service entities by constituent local authorities is to pre-empt
attempts by state governments to compulsorily amalgamate rural and remote councils on grounds
that they are sub-optimally small (Conway, Dollery and Grant, 2011). In an analogous vein,
shared service arrangements are sometimes simply an artefact of higher governmental policy;
local authorities establish shared serviced partnerships for the cynical purpose of securing grants,
subsidies and other financial benefits tied to the existence of shared service entities rather than as
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a bona fide effort at joint service provision. On other occasions, shared service partnerships arise
in response to directives from higher tiers of government due to moral suasion or, at a more base
level, to avoid penalties such as reductions in intergovernmental grants. In many instances, at
least in the Australian local government context, the real objective of shared service entities is
avowedly political, deriving from the common perception that a regional body carries greater
‘political clout’ than the sum of its constituent members. Thus joint organizations are founded
with ostensible shared service roles, such as ‘regional policy coordination’, but whose actual
intent is simply to act as a political lobby group.
Despite these shortcomings the Hawkins (2009) typology of reasons for adopting shared service
approaches is useful from the point of view of informing public policy. Various generic policy
interventions suggest themselves. For example, in common with the earlier proposed policy
stance on removing barriers or obstacles to joint ventures between local authorities through
legislative templates, an obvious step would be to reduce the costs of establishing shared service
entities through enabling legislation providing greater certainty to participating councils, as well
as simple, inexpensive establishment procedures. A parallel policy imitative would be to provide
financial incentives to local authorities to establish shared service entities, subject to assurances
on the viability of the proposed arrangements. In order to avoid cynical ‘gaming’ of incentives,
combined with a ‘once-in-stay-in’ stipulation, incentives can be staggered and ‘back-loaded’ so
that most of the funds are transferred to the shared service entity well after it has demonstrated
successful operation.
In addition to these positive ‘carrot’ measures, ‘third party coercion and incentives’ can also be
extended to include negative ‘stick’ policies. For example, in the Australian local government
milieu, where forced amalgamation has been deployed by governments in almost all state
jurisdictions, groups of councils threatened with merger have sought to stave off compulsory
consolidation by proposing to form shared service entities designed to secure the even greater
scale and scope economies than the intended amalgamation. Since these joint ventures have the
intended aim of avoiding consolidation, they have sometimes proved illusory as valid shared
service providers in the longer term. However, it has been argued that the most noteworthy
feature of this phenomenon has been the superior galvanising effect of threatened amalgamation
compared to the comparatively ineffectual alternative policies which have been employed
(Dollery, Crase and O’Keefe, 2009). Threats of compulsory structural reform, including forced
mergers, could thus be used as a catalyst to encourage small councils to establish shared service
entities. Legal obligations binding all councils to these arrangements, together periodic
monitoring of these entities, would assist in preventing the creation of ‘phony’ joint ventures.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has explored the problem of shared services in local government by considering the
foundations of shared services, including the nascent conceptual literature and existing empirical
evidence, as well as the question of developing policies to promote inter-municipal collaboration.
While efforts aimed at constructing formal theoretical shared service models have yet to prove
fruitful, a good deal of worthwhile knowledge on both the suitability of different types of
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municipal services for shared service arrangements, as well as the economic performance of
alternative kinds of services, can be drawn from the empirical literature.
However, much less is known about the public policies which can effectively stimulate the
introduction of shared service arrangements. Following the Hawkins (2009) framework, we have
considered (a) policies aimed at removing obstacles to shared services and (b) policies targeted at
strengthening the ‘attractive’ features of shared services. While this preliminary analysis is
suggestive, much more remains to be done. Two avenues for further research seem potentially
rewarding. In the first place, further empirical analyses of the efficacy of actual shared service
policy could make a valuable contribution. Secondly, shared service provision could be
decomposed into its component categories of production, management and policy, the problem
of which of these three dimensions should be tackled at the local level or regional level
investigated, and then disaggregated policy designed for different levels of decision-making
explored.
REFERENCES

Allan, P. (2001), Secession: A Manifesto for an Independent Balmain Local Council, Balmain,
Balmain Secession Movement.
Allan, P. (2003), ‘Why Smaller Councils Make Sense’, Australian Journal of Public
Administration, 62(3), 74-81.
Andrew, S. A. (2009), ‘Recent Developments in the Study of Inter-jurisdictional Agreements:
An Overview.’ State and Local Government Review, 41(2), 133-142.
Andrews, R. and Entwistle, T. (2010), ‘Does Cross-Sectoral Partnerships Deliver? An Empirical
Exploration of Public Service Effectiveness, Efficiency and Equity’, Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 20(3), 679-701.
Aulich, C. (2005), ‘Australia: Still a Tale of Cinderella?’ In Comparing Local Governance:
Trends and Developments, in B. Denters and L.E. Rose (eds.), Basingstoke, Palgrave
MacMillan, 193-210.
Bahl, R. and Cyan, M (2011), ‘Tax assignment: Does the Practice Match the Theory?’,
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 29 (2), 264-280.
Bahl, R, Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Youngman, J. (eds.) (2010), Challenging the Conventional
Wisdom on the Property Tax, Cambridge, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Bain, J.S. (1951), ‘Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing
1936-1940”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65 (2), 293-324.
Bain, J.S. (1956), Barriers to New Competition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Bartolini, D. and Fiorillo, F. (2005), Local Council Partnership: A Theoretical Approach, SIEP
Working Papers, 463, Pavia, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
Bartolini, D. and Fiorillo, F. (2006), ‘Le Associazioni Fra Comuni: Un Approccio Teorico’, in F.
Fiorillo and L. Robotti (eds.), L’Unione Dei Comuni. Teoria Economica Ed Esperienze
Concrete, Milan, Franco Angeli, 73–100.
Bartolini, D. and Fiorillo, F. (2008), ‘Local Council Partnerships: A Theoretical Approach’, in
B. E. Dollery and L. Robotti (eds.), Theory and Practice of Local Government Reform,
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 53-68.
Bish, R. (2001), Local Government Amalgamation: Discredited Nineteenth Century Ideals Alive
in the Twenty-First Century, C. D Howe Institute, Toronto.

Options for Rationalizing Local Government Structure: A Policy Agenda

15

Brosio, G., Maggi, M and Piperno, S. (2003), Governo e Finanza Locale, Torino, Giappichelli.
Boyne, G.A. (1998), Public Choice Theory and Local Government, Basingstoke Macmillan.
Buchanan, J. M. (1965), ‘An Economic Theory of Clubs’, Economica, 32 (125), 1–14.
Casella, A. and Frey, B. (1992), ‘Federalism and Clubs: Towards an Economic Theory of
Overlapping Political Jurisdiction’, European Economic Review, 36, 639–646.
Carr J, Gerber E, Lupher E., (2009), ‘Local Fiscal Capacity and Inter-governmental Contracting:
Horizontal and Vertical Cooperation in Michigan’, in R. J. Adelaja and A. Sands (eds.),
Sustaining Michigan: Metropolitan Policies and Strategies, East Lansing, MI: Michigan
State University Press.
Chen, Y. C., and Thurmaier, K., 2009. ‘Interlocal Agreements as Collaborations: An Empirical
Investigation of Impetuses, Norms, and Success.’ American Review of Public
Administration, 39: 536-552.
Clarke, R. (1985), Industrial Economics, Blackwell, Oxford.
Conway, M., Dollery, B. E. and Grant, B. (2011), ‘Shared Service Models in Australian Local
Government: The Fragmentation of the New England Strategic Alliance Five Years on’,
Australian Geographer, 42(2), 207-223.
Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government
(DITRDLG) (2010), 2007/08 Local Government National Report, Canberra, Australian
Government.
Derman, H. and Gates, B., 1995. Local Government Shared Services and Municipal
Consolidation: A Report and an Agenda. Trenton, N.J.: Department of Community
Affairs.
Dollery, B. E. and Akimov, A., (2008), ‘Are Shared Services a Panacea for Australian Local
Government? A Critical Note on Australian and International Empirical Evidence’,
International Review of Public Administration, 12(2), 1-11.
Dollery, B. E. and Byrnes, J., 2006. ‘Alternatives to Amalgamation in Australian Local
Government: The Case of Walkerville.’ Journal of Economic and Social Policy 11(1):
1-20.
Dollery, B. E., Akimov, A. and Byrnes, J. (2009), ‘Shared Services in Australian Local
Government: Rationale, Alternative Models and Empirical Evidence’, Australian
Journal of Public Administration, 68(2), 208-219.
Dollery, B. E. and L. Crase (2004), ‘Is Bigger Local Government Better? An Evaluation of the
Case for Australian Municipal Amalgamation Programs’, Urban Policy and Research,
22(3), 265-276.
Dollery, B. E., Crase, L. and O’Keefe, S. (2009), ‘Improving Efficiency in Australian Local
Government: Structural Reform as a Catalyst for Effective Reform’, Geographical
Research, 47(3), 269-279.
Dollery, B. E. Garcea, J. and LeSage, E. (eds.) (2008), Local Government Reform: A
Comparative Analysis of Advanced Anglo-American Countries, Cheltenham, Edward
Elgar Publishers.
Dollery, B. E., Crase, L. and Johnson, A. (2006), Australian Local Government Economics,
UNSW Press, Sydney.
Dollery, B. E., Grant, B. and Akimov, A. (2010), ‘A Typology of Shared Service Provision in
Australian Local Government’, Australian Geographer, 41(2), 217-231.

16

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

Dollery, B. E., Grant, B. J. and Crase, L. (2011), ‘Not What They Seem: An Analysis of
Strategic Service Delivery Partnerships in Local Government’, Australasian Canadian
Studies (in print).
Dollery, B. E., Marshall, N. A., Sancton, A. and Witherby, A., 2004. ‘Regional Capacity
Building: How Effective is REROC?’ Wagga Wagga, Riverina Eastern Regional
Organization of Councils.
Fiorillo, F. and Pola, G. (2008), ‘Financial Incentives for Municipal Partnerships’ in B. E.
Dollery and L. Robotti (eds.), Theory and Practice of Local Government Reform,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 81-92.
Garcea, J. and LeSage, E. (eds.) (2005), Municipal Reform in Canada, Toronto, Oxford
University Press.
Gershon, P., 2004. Releasing Resources for the Frontline: Independent Review of Public Sector
Efficiency. Norwich: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
Hawkins, C. V., 2009. ‘Prospects for and Barriers to Local Government Joint Ventures. State
and Local Government Review, 41(2): 108-119.
Hawkins, C. V., 2010a. ‘Competition and Cooperation: Local Government Joint Ventures for
Economic Development.’ Journal of Urban Affairs, 32(2): 253-275
Honadle, B.W., (1984), ‘Alternative Service Delivery Strategies and Improvement of Local
Government Productivity’, Public Productivity Review, 8(4), 201-313.
Independent Inquiry into Local Government Inquiry (LGI) (‘Allan Report’) (2006), Are Councils
Sustainable? Final Report: Findings and Recommendations, Sydney, NSW Local
Government and Shires Association.
Jimenez, B. S. and Hendrick, R. (2010), ‘Is Local Government Consolidation the Answer?’,
State and Local Government Review, 42(3), 258-270.
Kwon, S.-W. & Feiock, R. C., 2010. ‘Overcoming the Barriers to Cooperation:
Intergovernmental Service agreements.’ Public Administration Review, 70(6): 876-884.
Leland, S. M. and Thurmaier, K. (eds.) (2010), City-County Consolidation: Promises Made,
Promises Kept?, Washington D.C., Georgetown University Press.
Lenk, T. and Falken-Grober, C. (2008), ‘Structural Reform in Germany’, in B. E. Dollery and L.
Robotti (eds.), The Theory and Practice of Local Government Reform, Cheltenham,
Edward Elgar Publishers, 149-172.
Leroux, K. and Carr, J. B., 2007. ‘Explaining Local Government Cooperation on Public Works:
Evidence from Michigan.’ Public Works Management & Policy, 12(1): 344-358.
Leroux, K. and Carr, J. B., 2010. ‘Prospects for Centralising Services in an Urban County:
Evidence from Eight Self-organized Networks of Local Public Services.’ Journal of
Urban Affairs, 32(4): 449-470.
Local Government Association of Queensland (LGAQ) (2005), Size, Shape and Sustainability of
Queensland Local Government: Discussion Paper, Brisbane, LGAQ.
Mason, E.S. (1949), “The Current State of the Monopoly Problem in the United States’, Harvard
Law Review, 62(4), 1265-85.
Oakerson, R. J. (1999), Governing Local Public Economies, Oakland, ICS Press.
Palestrini, A. and Polidori, P. (2006), ‘Le Unioni di Comuni: Un Analisi Teorica Della Loro
Costituzione e Stabilità’, in F. Fiorillo and L. Robotti (eds), L’Unione dei Comuni.
Teoria Economica ed Esperienze Concrete, Milan, Franco Angeli, 101–116.

Options for Rationalizing Local Government Structure: A Policy Agenda

17

Palestrini, A. and Polidori, P. (2008), ‘A Theoretical Model of Shared Service Arrangements in
Local Government’, in B. E. Dollery and L. Robotti (eds.), Theory and Practice of Local
Government Reform, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 69-80.
Quagliani, A. (2006), ‘Perchè l’Unione? La Norma, la Prassi, le Questioni Aperte’, in F. Fiorillo
and L. Robotti (eds.), L’unione di Comuni: Teoria Economica ed Esperienze Concrete,
Milan: Franco Angeli, 27–38.
Ruggini, J. (2006), ‘Making Local Government More Workable through Shared Services’,
Government Finance Review, February, 31-36.
Sancton, A. (2000), Merger Mania, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press.
Serco Solutions (2005), Shared Services as a Long-term Solution for Local Government:
Delivering on the Gershon Report, Birmingham, Serco Solutions.
Shah, A. (2006a), Local Governance in Industrial Countries, Washington, D. C., World Bank.
Shah, A. (2006b), Local Governance in Developing Countries, Washington, D. C., World Bank.
Shah, A. (2006c), ‘A Comparative Institutional Framework for Responsive, Responsible and
Accountable Local Governance’, in A. Shah (ed.), Local Governance in Industrial
Countries, Washington, D.C.,World Bank., 1-40,
Thurmaier, K. and Wood, C. (2004), ‘Interlocal Agreements as an Alternative to Consolidation’,
in J. B. Carr and R. C. Feiock (eds.), City-County Consolidation and Its Alternatives,
New York, M. E. Sharpe, 113-130.
Tomkinson, R. (2007), Shared Services in Local Government, Aldershot, Gower Publishing.
Van den Berg, L. and Braun, E. (1999), ‘Urban Competitiveness, Marketing and the Need for
Organizing Capacity’, Urban Studies, 36 (5/6), 987–999.
Warner, M. E. and Hebdon, R. (2001), ‘Local Government Restructuring: Privatization and its
Alternatives’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 20, 315-336.
Warner, M. E. and Hefetz, A. (2008), ‘Managing Markets for Public Service: The Role of Mixed
Public/Private Delivery of City Services’, Public Administration Review, 68(1), 155166.
Wolman, H. (2008), Comparing Local Government Systems across Countries: Conceptual and
Methodological Challenges to Building a Field of Comparative Local Government
Studies’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 26(1), 87-103.

